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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The merit of having an infrastructure less network was first discovered in the 1970s.  At 
that time, Computers were bulky and so were the radio transreceivers.  Since then, the 
technology of both computers and radio communication has improved many folds. This 
exceptional growth gave birth to the wireless network. With rapid development in 
wireless communication technology, Ad-Hoc Mobile Wireless Network (MANETs) have 
emerged and evolved in many forms [12]. MANETs are rapidly gaining popularity 
because they do not rely on a pre-infrastructure and can be deployed spontaneously. 
Application of MANETs ranges from offices to modern battlefields. The distributed 
nature of MANETs has eliminated the need for centralized authentication and 
monitoring.  
However, compared to wired networks, MANETs are more vulnerable to security attacks 
due to their unique features, such as stringent power consumption, error prone 
communication media and highly dynamic network topology [12]. Confidentiality, 
integrity and availability are three major requirements for any information security 
systems. To achieve confidentiality and integrity, cryptography solutions of wired 
networks can be used with little or no change. However, the security of MANETs has 
been challenged by covert manipulation of communicating network entities due to usage 
of lightweight protocols of MANETs. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can also be 
successfully launched due to the lightweight protocols and energy restrictions of 
MANETs. The limitations of MANETs resources prevent the implementation of
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sophisticated security measures in a MANET. Securing a MANET therefore is a 
challenging task. Although, a number of papers have been focused on securing and 
guarding against attacks, as far as we are aware, nobody has investigated counter attacks 
as a defense mechanism in MANETs. 
1.1.1 Problems with  existing approaches 
Since security is very important in MANETs, numerous investigations have been done on 
security issues in MANETs. Some have focused on key management; others have 
focused on identifying a specific type of attack and measures to stop it. Intrusion 
prevention mechanism like encryption of message and authentication can be used in 
MANETs to reduce intrusions, but cannot eliminate them completely. The history of 
security has mostly focused on developing defensive mechanisms, such as Firewalls, 
Gateways etc, but very little work has looked at offensive measures to be taken post 
detection. Currently existing offensive responses are developed to handle a specific type 
of attack. But there does not exist a general offensive mechanism that can be used in any 
attack situation. Rather than replacing traditional defensive mechanisms, offensive 
counter mechanisms will complement these approaches thereby strengthening the 
security of the MANET. 
1.1.2 Proposed Approach 
In this thesis, we propose three counter attack models, namely, Round Robin attack, Self-
Whisper attack and flooding attack.  The goal of all these attacks is to use up intruder 
critical resources like energy, communication, processing, storage and thereby force the 
intruder to eventually enter into a DoS status.  
The counterattack models will depend on the goals of the offensive response.  If the goal 
is to learn about what kind of information the intruder is looking for, different attack 
models can be used. The goal will be realized via agent nodes. An agent node is a 
dedicated, specialized node whose job is to carry out the DoS or other attack against the 
intruder in coordination with other agent nodes deployed and distributed across the 
MANET.  The agent nodes can communicate with each other using multicast.  
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Some important advantages an offensive approach has against an intruder are: 
I. Psychological Advantage: Once an adversary node knows that there are nodes 
inside the target network which can retaliate, this gives the attacker an impression 
that the target network is well protected, forcing it to think twice before attacking 
the network or continuing with the attack. Such a situation may force the 
adversary node to either retreat or make a mistake which can be further exploited 
by agent nodes.  Hence, our proposed approach can drastically reduce the chances 
of attack in the first place and improve network security.  
II. Added Layer of Security: An offensive approach adds an extra layer of security 
to the defensive measures in place. 
III. Reduced Rate of Successful Attack: Another advantage of the proposed 
approach is that it significantly reduces the rate of successful attacks against the 
network. In order to attack the network, an adversary node first needs to defeat the 
agent nodes, then penetrate the defensive wall of Firewalls and Gateways. This 
makes an attacker’s task more complicated and risky. 
IV. Learn about Attacker Resources: Another advantage of going offensive is that, 
it helps to extract knowledge about the attacker such as the power of the attacker 
in terms of critical resources like bandwidth, processing, storage capacity, and 
power. Knowing about these critical resources help the agent nodes to formulate 
an effective strategy against the adversary node.  
V. Buy Time: Going offensive against the attacker will slow down the attack and 
hence will buy more time to organize agent nodes, strengthen the security of the 
network and formulate an effective strategy against the attacker.  
VI. Waste Attacker Resource: One important advantage of an offensive approach 
against an attacker is that, it wastes critical resources of the attacker, like 
power, storage, bandwidth and processing. Most of the devices that operate in 
an ad hoc mobile network are battery operated. These devices have limited 
power supply and hence the more work they have to do in terms of processing or 
transmitting data, the sooner they will consume their power. 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this thesis is to study the feasibility and effectiveness of counter 
attacks in a MANET. The effectiveness of these models will be measured based on the 
following three parameters: 
 Time taken to neutralize/marginalize the intruder node. 
 Energy consumed to neutralize/marginalize the intruder node. 
 Damage done to intruder in terms of resources. 
The research objectives are as follows: 
 Review the general security requirements of MANETs. 
 Identify and classify the major attacks in MANETs. 
 Explore the existing counter measures against classified attacks. 
 Propose and study counter attack models that can be used against any kind 
of intruder attack effectively. 
 Develop a framework of counter attack models. 
 Design algorithms to carry out the counter attack for each proposed model. 
 Simulate the proposed models and compare them to find out the best 
possible models, if any. 
 
1.3 Research Contribution 
We study the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed counter attack model for the 
security of MANETs.  DoS attack is used as the primary tool for an attacking intruder 
node. The counter attack will be carried by surrounding the intruder node with agent 
nodes where each agent node will first position itself into direct radio transmission range 
of the intruder node before launching a DoS attack. This will ensure that the effect of 
counter attacks should not disrupt the normal functioning of the network. 
 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of 
MANETs and their potential applications. In addition, it describes the security issues, 
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types of attack and countermeasures in MANETs. Chapter 3 proposes our counter attack 
model. Chapter 4 evaluates the counter attack model with simulations. Finally, a 
summary of this thesis and a discussion of future work are presented in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Ad Hoc Mobile Wireless Network        
 A mobile ad-hoc wireless network (MANET) is a collection of two or more wireless 
devices equipped with wireless communications capability that does not have any fixed 
infrastructure or centralized authentication system.  Such devices can communicate with 
another device that is immediately within their radio range or outside their radio range 
through relay nodes [12]. A mobile ad-hoc wireless network is self organizing and 
adaptive. Since MANETs do not rely on any network entities, MANET can be formed or 
de-formed on the fly without any additional infrastructure. Since any device equipped 
with wireless communication can join the ad-hoc network, there is a vast heterogeneity 
among devices. This vast heterogeneity among devices means that communication, 
storage, computation and power consumption of these devices also vary tremendously 
[12]. 
To facilitate the communication in ad-hoc wireless network, many protocols have been 
developed. But none of these protocols have yet been standardized. However, one 
protocol in particular is gaining popularity and maybe standardized soon. The Ad-hoc 
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol allows on-fly formation of 
network. It allows users to find and maintain routes to other users in the network when 
such routes are needed. The AODV routing protocol provides unicast, multicast and 
broadcast communication in ad-hoc mobile networks [4].  
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Figure 2.1 Heterogeneous mobile device ad hoc networks 
 
2.2 Challenges Facing Ad Hoc Mobile Wireless Network 
Ad hoc networks face many major challenges. We will focus on challenges related to 
Routing, Energy Efficiency, and protocols. Some of these major challenges are 12]: 
1) Media Access 
Given the fact that MANETs lack centralized control  and there is no static 
node, the MAC protocol must contend for access to the channel while at same 
time avoiding possible collision with neighboring nodes. In addition, the 
problem of hidden and exposed terminals must be accounted for when 
designing the MAC protocol for MANETs. 
2) Routing 
The typical distance vector routing protocols of wired network cannot work in 
the highly dynamic and in deterministic topology of MANETs. The typical 
multicast protocols in wired network will not work with MANETs. Multicast 
protocols of wired network work because nodes are static in nature, unlike 
MANETs. 
3) Energy Efficiency 
Forwarding packets on behalf of others will consume power, and this can be 
quite significant for nodes in an ad hoc network. Hence, power unaware 
protocols of wired network are not effective for an ad hoc network. Moreover, 
the battery technology is still lagging behind microprocessor technology. A 
typical LI-Ion battery will last 2-3 hrs. Hence, energy conservation is the most 
important factor for a node in an ad hoc network. 
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4) TCP performance 
TCP relies on measuring round trip time (RTT) and packet loss to conclude if 
congestion has occurred in the network. Unfortunately, TCP is unable to 
differentiate between node mobility and network congestion. Mobility of node 
in an ad hoc network may result in either packet loss or longer RTT. Hence, 
some enhancement is required for TCP to work well in an ad hoc network. 
5) Service Location, Provision and Access 
The ad hoc network consists of heterogeneous devices and not all of them are 
capable of playing the role of server. This means that traditional client/server 
RPC will not work in ad hoc networks.  
6) Security and Privacy 
As any node in an ad hoc network can play the role of router, it is important to 
make sure that the node is authentic and only authentic nodes are forwarding 
packets. It is very easy for a node to deceive in an ad hoc network. It can 
manipulate the protocol by replaying false information such as the shortest 
distance to destination. Attacks in MANETs include Sinkhole/Black hole, 
Sybil, wormhole attacks.  
2.3 Applications   
1. Office 
Mobile ad hoc devices can automatically recognize the presence of other 
devices through sensing the presence of neighboring beacons. This will 
allows the synchronization of devices and transfer of emails, files, 
personal calendar seamlessly from handheld devices to desktop. 
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Figure 2.2 Mobile Devices talking to each other. 
 
2. Traveling 
A passenger carrying a personal wireless ad hoc device which on entry to 
the airport terminal will be able automatically communicate with the air 
line system via an ad hoc wireless access point. Since the ticket is already 
booked, an electronic version of the boarding pass or confirmation seat 
number can then be assigned and conveyed to the passenger, thus. 
eliminating the need to stand in a queue. 
3. Home 
A user ad hoc device can communicate with home wireless device to 
perform various tasks on behalf of the user. For example, ad hoc devices 
worn by different family members can be programmed to have different 
levels of control and setting for house hold electronic devices. 
 
Figure 2.3 Smart Home 
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4. Shopping Mall 
The shopping malls of the future will have their products installed with 
cheap RF tags. A customer carrying a handheld wireless device can read 
the product price and related information even without entering the shop. 
5. Modern Battlefield 
Ad hoc networks are known as self organizing networks. Through multi 
hop communications, soldiers can communicate to remote soldiers via 
data hopping or data forwarding from one radio device to another. 
Through ad hoc networks, it is possible to wirelessly manage the minute 
sensor networks which are scattered throughout enemy territory. 
 
Figure 2.4 Battlefields 
6. Location/Context based Service 
When a user equipped with ad hoc communication device enters a 
shopping mall, the shopping mall ad hoc network will automatically send 
him fast selling products, information about dining, movies currently 
running in theaters etc. Analogously, the same can be done when a user 
visits a museum, airport etc.  
2.4 Limitations  
Ad hoc nodes are typically characterized by limited power supplies, small memory size 
and limited computational ability. Ad Hoc wireless networks typically use a low 
bandwidth because communication bandwidth is very expensive, consuming large 
amounts of energy and processing power. Unreliable communication is another threat to 
Ad Hoc network security. Packet-based routing of the Ad Hoc network is connectionless 
unreliable transfer. In high density MANETs, because of the Broadcast nature of 
MANETs, nodes can interfere with each other’s communications. The large amount of 
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latency in the network is caused by multi-hop routing, network congestion, and node 
processing [4]. Hence, communication between nodes in a MANETs is unreliable. 
 
2.5 Security Requirement of MANETs 
Nodes in Ad Hoc networks need to have the following capabilities to successfully deal 
with attacks.  
 Light weight Encryption Algorithms: They need an encryption algorithm that 
consumes little power but gives high standard data encryption. 
 Time Synchronization: Nodes in ad hoc network can periodically synchronize 
their timer. This will help to track any attack in the network by calculating the 
round trip timer (RTT). 
Because of the limitations of ad hoc networks, supporting secure communication in 
such a network is a great challenge. The general security requirements of ad hoc 
networks are as follows: 
 Data Confidentiality: The nodes communicating to each other may want 
maintain their data privacy from neighbor nodes. 
 Data Authentication:  Nodes needs to make sure that data that they  receive 
originate from an authentic source, not from an adversary 
 Data Integrity: Ad hoc networks need to make sure that data has not been altered 
by an adversary node. 
 Data Freshness: Ad hoc network needs to make sure that messages are not 
retransmitted or replayed. 
 Robustness: Ad hoc networks have to be robust in nature to minimize the impact 
of any successful attack. 
2.6 Types of Attacks and Counter Measures 
2.6.1 Wormhole Attack         
In the wormhole attack, a malicious node picks the packet from one location of the 
network and tunnels it to another malicious node at another location in the network, 
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which replays it locally [1]. The wormhole tunnel can be established in many ways 
such as packet encapsulation, out of band channel, high power transmission, Packet 
Relay, Protocol Deviation [1].  The Wormhole attack exploits one of the features of 
the ADOV protocol where the AODV protocol allows a node to choose the shortest 
route from source to destination, when multiple routes have been discovered during 
the “route discovering “phase of the protocol [4]. To counter the wormhole attack 
Yih-Chun, Adrian and David [5] proposed packet leashes, where a leash is any 
information that can be added to the packet designed to limit the maximum allowed 
transmission distance [5]. There are two categories of packet leashes: 1. Geographical 
Leash 2.  Temporal Leash. A geographical leash makes sure that the recipient is at a 
certain distance from sender. On other hand, a temporal leash puts an upper bound on 
how far the packet can go. A Geographical leash can be created if each node knows 
its own location as well as some rough estimation about the receiver location. All the 
nodes need to have some kind of loosely synchronized clock which allow them to 
validate each other packet timestamp. On the other hand, a temporal leash requires 
that each node in the network must have a tightly synchronized clock with the 
maximum difference in each other’s clock not exceeding few micro or nano seconds 
[5]. However, in certain circumstances, even packet leashes will not prevent a 
wormhole attack, such as when the sender and receiver are not within transmission 
range of each other [5].            
 
Figure 2.5 Wormhole Attack 
 
2.6.2 Black hole/Sinkhole Attack       
The original AODV protocol operates on the assumption that all the nodes in the network 
are trustworthy [4]. AODV allows a sender to always choose the shortest path to the 
destination [4]. This underlying assumption about the trust environment of the network 
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can easily be exploited by a malicious node. Because the malicious node does not have to 
check its routing table before replying to RREQ, the reply from a malicious node will 
always be faster than other nodes. On receiving the reply from a malicious node, the node 
which started a route discovery process, will conclude that route discovery is over and 
hence it will establish a route which actually runs through the malicious node. Any traffic 
through the malicious node can be lost or compromised. A Black hole attack is a kind of 
denial of service attack where a malicious node attracts all traffic falsely and drops them 
without forwarding them to the destination [3].  
To counteract this attack, Martin at el in [6] presented the idea of a watchdog. The 
watchdog method detects misbehaving nodes if a node in the route fails to forward the 
send packet within a time t set by sender. However, the authors fail to note that if a node 
is heavily loaded, it is possible that the time taken to forward the packet may be beyond 
the timeout period t to forward the packet. In this case, as per t [6], the node will flag as 
“misbehaving” which is not necessarily true. Also, a malicious node may overload an 
ordinary node intentionally so that it flagged as a “bad” node or a group of malicious 
nodes intentionally overload a part of the network and then partition the network based 
on the claim that most of the nodes in that portion of the network are flagged as “bad”. 
However, Animesh et al. [7], extended the idea of Martin [6], where they classify the 
nodes in the network into three categories, watchdog, ordinary and trusted. Few initial 
nodes that join the network are trusted nodes or in other words “good” nodes. Watchdog 
nodes must be selected from the group of trusted nodes only. Any node that joins the 
network thereafter will join as an ordinary node. The watchdog node continuously keeps 
tracking SUSPECT_THRESHOLD and ACCEPTANCE_THRESHOLD  thresholds. If an ordinary 
node crosses the set SUSPECT_THRESHOLD, it declared as a “malicious” node. On the 
other hand, if a node crosses its ACCEPTANCE_THRESHOLD, it will be promoted to the 
group of trusted nodes. Also, watchdog nodes are selected for specific period of time 
only. Once the time period expires, a new set of watchdog nodes need to be selected from 
the group of trusted nodes. 
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Figure 2.6 Black hole/Sinkhole Attack 
2.6.3 Sybil Attack         
The Sybil attack was first reported by Douceur in the context of peer-to-peer networks 
[8]. In the Sybil attack, a node illegally claims multiple identities. In the worst case, an 
attacker may generate any number of nodes by using just one physical device. The Sybil 
attack can be launched in various forms, direct vs. indirect communication, fabricated vs. 
stolen identities and simultaneous attacks. There are several known Sybil attacks such as 
Distributed attacks, Routing attacks, Data Aggregation, Voting, Fair resource allocation, 
Misbehavior detection [8]. Karlof and Wagner [9] pointed out that the Sybil attack can be 
used against multipath routing protocols in MANET. It is possible that all disjointed path 
might actually be going through a single malicious node. All the above mentioned attacks 
can be launched because the Sybil node simply overcame the ordinary nodes.  
To counter the attack Douceur [8] proposes resource testing as a method of direct 
verification of node identity. In resource testing, it is assumed that each node is limited in 
physical resources. The resource proposed by Douceur for this purpose is computation, 
communication and storage. But any of these resources can be manipulated by a 
malicious node, because, a malicious node is assumed to generally have large amounts of 
storage, computation and communication capabilities. However, James, Elaine, Dawn 
and Adrian in [2], proposed some new defenses against Sybil attack like Radio resource 
testing, verification of key for random key redistribution, registration and position 
verification.  
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Figure 2.7 Sybil Attack 
 
 2.6.4 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack    
The “Ad Hoc Flooding Attack (AHFA)” [10] can result in a DOS attack if used against 
reactive routing protocols such as DSR and AODV. The AODV protocol has some sort 
of inbuilt defense against a DOS attack. A node cannot originate more than 
RREQ_RATELIMIT messages per second. Also, after originating a RREQ packet, a node 
will wait for a route reply (RREP) packet which has a TTL (Time to live) associated with 
it. A node can re-broadcast RREQ packet only if it will not receive RREP packet within a 
specified TTL time. However, an adversary node may violate all the rules and broadcast 
mass route requests (RREQ) with higher TTL values for a distant or non-existing IP 
addresses in the network. If the IP address does not exist in network, then RREQ packet 
remains in the network for a longer period of time. Consequently, all the routes in the 
network will be flooded with the adversary node’s RREQ packet. The adversary’s 
objective behind this mass broadcast is to exhaust the communication bandwidth of the 
network, hence depriving legitimate nodes from valid network communications. The ad 
hoc flooding attack in mobile wireless network is similar to SYN attack in wired 
networks. 
To counteract this attack, Ping Yi [10] and his team have developed a defense against ad 
hoc flooding called Neighbor Suppression. In neighbor suppression each node computes 
the rate of RREQ. If a node’s neighbor finds that the node RREQ rate has crossed a 
defined threshold, Rate_RREQ, it will blacklist the node and does not accept any RREQ 
packets originating from the node. Hence, if an Intruder tries to flood the network with 
mass broadcasting of RREQ packets, its neighbor will eventually Blacklist it as soon as 
the intruder node crosses the defined threshold. 
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Figure 2.8 HELLO packets Flooding Attack 
 
2.7 Comparative study of Simulators 
There are many simulators for wireless sensor networks. Evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses and choosing the proper simulator to realize the model is very important. 
Five simulators were selected and are compared below: 
Aspect J-Sim OMNet++ NS-2 ShoX NetLogo 
Visualization Nam Trace 
File 
No Own 
Tool 
online with 
model 
inspection, 
to go back, 
simulation 
must be 
repeated 
Trace file, 
can be 
viewed 
with nam 
trace file, 
internal 
viewer 
Dynamic 
plot, the 
command 
center can 
show the 
internal 
result 
Statistic online plot, 
exporting to 
file must be 
done by user 
trace file, 
can be 
displayed 
with plove 
log file, 
can be 
displayed 
with 
xgraph 
statistics file, 
internal 
viewer or 
export to 
gnuplot 
Dynamic 
plot, 
exporting to 
file 
Strengths flexibility 
Java based 
maturity 
model 
inspection 
GUI 
support 
model base 
user base 
GUI support 
visualization 
architecture 
GUI support 
visualization 
Weakness GUI support 
visualization 
capabilities 
energy 
model 
MAC 
competitors 
OTcl 
architecture 
documentation 
lack of models 
architecture 
 
Table 2.1 Comparative Study of Simulators 
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NS-2 is the software which best meets our requirements. Our requirements are:  
 A simulator with support for Mobile Networking and AODV ad-hoc protocol 
 A simulator with visualization capability 
 A flexible simulator that supports the development of new customized protocols 
 A simulator with tools for recording and analyzing simulation 
 NS-2 supports the above requirements and was therefore chosen. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
COUNTER ATTACK MODELS 
 
This chapter focuses on the design issues of the proposed counter attack model and 
their operation in the real world. The main goal behind these counter attack models is 
to exhaust the intruder’s resources like energy, communication bandwidth and hence 
force it either to leave the network or to ultimately die. However, the potential use of 
these models is not limited as an attack tool, but they can also be used to extract the 
intruder’s interest, which will help network administrators to learn about intruder 
behavior.  
 
3.1 Problem Specification 
The counter-attack model is primarily focused on intruder presence and is independent 
of the attack launched by the intruder. The following assumptions have been made to 
build the counter attack models: 
1. The System has already identified the intruder node inside the network. 
2. Agent nodes are equipped to track any node inside the network in real time. 
3. Agent nodes are part of a single group and use the multicast feature of AODV to 
communicate with each other. No other node can join the group. 
4. Agent nodes always launch an attack in coordination with each other.  
5. Before launching a counter-attack, agent nodes must position themselves in direct 
communication range of the intruder node.  
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6. All the nodes in the network including intruder are identical in terms of resource 
capabilities such as energy, communication range, communication bandwidth, 
processing & storage. All the nodes in the network have equal initial energy, 
equal communication bandwidth and equal radio transmission range. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                         Ordinary Node             Intruder               Communication Range      
Fig 3.1 Network Model 
 
3.3 Outline of Approach       
This thesis primarily focuses on studying the effectiveness of proposed counter attack 
models against an intruder. The objectives of the different models are: 
i. Minimize Time taken by a group of agent nodes to neutralize/marginalize the 
intruder node. 
ii. Maximize energy consumption rate of the intruder node. 
iii. Maximize the packet drop rate of the intruder node. 
We will measure the time, average energy consumption and packet drop rates of agent 
nodes as well as those of the intruder. 
 
Agent Node: These are dedicated mobile nodes with following features:  
 equipped with capability to track any node inside network in real time 
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 part of an exclusive counter attack group 
 passive in nature unless until not carrying out counter attack operations 
Counter Attack Group: A group of agent nodes.  
Ordinary Node: A node which is neither an agent node nor an intruder node. 
Intruder Node: A node inside the network which is carrying an unauthorized activity  
Each of three counter-attack modes is used to measure the three parameters mentioned 
above in this section. The models are: 
I. Round Robin Counter-Attack: We will evaluate round robin on the three 
parameters identified above. The primary objective of this counterattack model is 
to make the attacker consume his energy, that is, objective two above. In 
particular we measure the average energy consumption rate of a group of agent 
nodes as well as that of intruder. Round robin allows only one of the agent nodes 
to carry a counter-attack at any given time, and as all the nodes are identical, the 
probability of an agent node to successfully launch a DoS attack against the 
intruder is very low. Hence the packet drop rate by the attacker is expected to be 
very low. Hence energy consumption is the main goal of this counterattack.  
II. Flooding Counter-Attack: In this model, the prime objective is to quickly 
marginalize/neutralize intruder node (objective 1 above) and also to increase 
packet drop rate by intruder (objective 3), thereby quickly imposing a DoS on the 
attacker. Because flooding counter-attack allows multiple simultaneous 
communication channel to be opened through the intruder, all agents will start 
communicating with the intruder at the same time. This sudden rise in traffic 
should consume intruder energy and communication bandwidth faster than the 
round robin. Hence, time taken in this model to neutralize intruder should be less 
than the round robin counter-attack model. 
III. Self-Whisper Counter-Attack: Because self whisper is a hybrid of the round 
robin and flooding counter-attack models, where multiple pairs of communication 
channels can be opened through the intruder and each pair of communication will 
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occur in round robin fashion, the objective of this attack is to achieve all three 
goals as identified above.     
The above three counter attack models will be compared to find best model where agent 
nodes spend less energy, drop less number of packets and take less time to neutralize the 
intruder. 
 
3.4 Proposed Counter Attack Models and their operation 
Terminology Used:   
1. REER: Route error. A node sends RRER if it does not have a route to destination 
2. RREQ:  Route request.  A node which wants a route to the destination broadcasts 
RREQ 
3. RREP: Route reply. If a node has route to the destination, it will reply to source 
with RREP. 
4. TTL: Time to live. A time stamp beyond which, a packet is considered as invalid 
5. MAXTTL: Maximum time to live. Time stamp to cover the entire network.  
 
3.4.1 Round Robin :  
Multiple selected agent nodes Ai  Ga (Group of agent nodes) send packets to an 
intruder node with a random packet size Pi for a time period Ti.  The value of Ti 
depends upon how the agent nodes are configured. If agent nodes are configured 
in such a way that they cannot consume more than X% of their available energy 
then Ti  will be the time required for agent node to consume X% of its available 
energy. Otherwise, each agent node will select a random value for Ti. The figure 
below shows the round robin scheme. 
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Fig 3.2 Round Robin Counter Attack Model 
 
                                        Agent Node     
                                        Normal Node 
                   Intruder 
                   Next Agent node to attack (Direction of round robin attack) 
                    Communication between intruder and normal nodes 
                   Agent attack against intruder 
                   Radio range of intruder 
                   GO Token       
The thesis will not consider how an agent node identifies its immediate left and right 
neighbor agent nodes or how and who will generate a GO token 
We make the following assumptions: 
I. Each agent node has a table called “LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR”. This table has 
three fields: LEFT_AGENT, RIGHT_AGENT, FORWARDED_TO 
 
Field Meaning Default Value 
LEFT_AGENT An agent left of this agent NULL 
RIGHT_AGENT An agent right of this 
agent 
NULL 
FORWARDED_TO An agent to which this 
agent has forwarded the 
token 
NULL 
1 4 
2 3 
GO
oO 
GO
oO 
GO
oO 
G0 
GO
oO 
 23 
 
 
II. Each agent node has another table called” INTRUDER_DETAILS”. This table has 
two fields: INTRUDER_ID, STATUS 
 
Field Meaning Default value 
INTRUDER_ID Node Id of Intruder NULL 
STATUS Indicates current status 
of intruder, 0- alive, 1- 
dead 
0 
 
III. GO token has two fields  
Field Meaning Default Value 
FORWARDING_TO An agent node to which 
this agent node has sent 
the GO token  
NULL 
FORWARDED_FROM An agent node from which 
this agent node has 
received the GO token 
NULL 
 
Algorithm: Initialization // Initialize LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR table for each agent node 
Step1. for i=0 to |Ga|   do,     //|Ga| will give number of agent nodes 
                      A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.LEFT_AGENT  Node ID of immediate left agent 
                      A[i]. LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT  Node ID of immediate right  agent 
            end 
 
 
 
Algorithm: Round Robin // Operation of Round Robin counter-attack model 
Step 1:  if(A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS=1) 
                            exit 
                else 
                       goto step 2 
Step2.  randomly choose packet size Pi    
Step3.  randomly choose attack duration Ti 
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Step4. while (Ti > 0 and A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS=0)  
do 
                  Send packets 
                  if( A[i] receive REER packet)    then  //If route broken   
                          while(TTL <= MAX TTL) 
                          do,     
                                Broadcast RREQ with address of intruder 
                                if (RREP not received within TTL time) 
                                      New TTLold TTL*2 
                         end  
                                     
                  else 
                        Decrement Ti  Ti  -1 
                        Continue sending packets 
                  end if 
            end 
            goto step 6 
 Step 5. Set A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS 1  //1 indicates intruder is dead or out of 
radio range of agent A[i] 
Step6. if (GO.FORWARDED_FROM = NULL)    //A[i] is first agent to start counter attack     
                 Set GO.FORWARDED_FROM Node id of A[i] 
Randomly pick A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.LEFT_AGENT  
A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT   and forward 
                 GO token 
            else if(GO.FORWARDED_FROM= A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.LEFT_AGENT)   
                        Set  GO.FORWARDED_FROM Node id of A[i] 
                        Forward GO token to A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT 
            else if(GO.FORWARDING_AGENT= A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT)   
                        Set Set GO.FORWARDED_FROM Node id of A[i] 
                        Forward GO token to A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT 
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Operation: 
Once the intruder identity has been confirmed by the network, the identity of the intruder 
will be multicast to the group of agent nodes. On receiving the intruder identity, each 
agent node will call Initialization to populate its INTRUDER_DETAILS table with 
INTRUDER_ID and initial STATUS as 0 indicating intruder is alive and present inside 
the network. The network will generate a GO token and randomly assign it to an agent 
node. The node which has possession of a GO token will activate a Round Robin Attack. 
The Agent node randomly chooses a packet size Pi and attack duration Ti. The packet 
size Pi and attack duration Ti for agent Ai are independent of those for agent Ai-1.  Then 
agent Ai evaluates the while condition. If the condition evaluates to true, agent Ai will 
start flooding the intruder node with packets. If Ai stops hearing periodic radio beacons 
from the intruder, it will assume that either the intruder is dead or it is out of radio 
transmission range of agent Ai . It will then update the STATUS field in table 
INTRUDER_DETAILS and forward the GO token to the next agent. If Ai has initial 
possession of the token, it will have the choice to forward the token to either its 
immediate right agent or left agent. However, if Ai  has received the token from other 
agent node, forwarding of token depends upon direction from which it has received the 
token. If Ai has received the token from left agent, it must forward the token to only its 
immediate right agent and vice-versa unless until its right agent or left agent value is 
NULL. The next agent node will again call the Round Robin Attack and each step will be 
executed as previously. 
The attack will stop when: 
 the intruder node consumes all its energy and eventually dies 
 the intruder node shuts down itself 
 the intruder leaves the network 
  all agent nodes consumes their energy and eventually die 
When an agent node sends a packet to the intruder, it awaits for an ACK from the 
intruder until TTL expires. If the intruder dies or shutdown itself or moves out of 
network, the agent node will receive RERR (route error) message. If the agent node does 
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not receive RREP within TTL time, it will double the TTL value and retransmit RREQ 
with a new TTL value. The Agent node will repeat this until the TTL value exceeds the 
MAX TTL value. Even at MAXTTL if an agent node does not receive an RREP packet, 
it will assume that intruder is either dead or shutdown itself or is out of network. It will 
then update the STATUS field to 1 and pass the GO token to the next agent in line. 
Eventually, when each agent node has STATUS value as 1, the if condition in step 1 will 
be TRUE and the attack stopped. 
It is important to note that agent nodes are free to vary the packet size for each packet that 
they send to the intruder as well the content of packet. This will help agent nodes to probe 
what kind of data the intruder is interested in by recording any variation in response time 
from the intruder for a transmitted packet, what is intruder’s processing capacity and 
communication bandwidth by measuring delay in the response time for a transmitted 
packet. This probing will be useful for models which aim to learn about the intruder’s 
critical resources and the kinds of data it is interested in. An agent node can choose to 
flood the intruder node with only control packets or it may choose to embed false data in 
order to waste the intruder’s storage buffer and increase packet processing time hence 
forcing the intruder to waste more energy on packet processing. 
3.4.2 Flooding Attack 
Multiple selected agent nodes send packets to the single intruder with a random packet 
size Pi and random period Ti. The purpose of this attack is to force the intruder node to 
decrease its communication with other ordinary nodes and eventually enter into a DoS 
status. The value of Ti  depends upon how the agent nodes are configured. If agent nodes 
are configured in such a way that they cannot consume more than X% of their available 
energy then Ti  will be the time required for an agent node to consume X% of its available 
energy. Otherwise, each agent node will select a random value for Ti.   Figure 3.3 below 
shows the Flooding counter-attack model in operation. 
We make the following assumptions: 
I. Each agent node has a table” INTRUDER_DETAILS”. This table has two field: 
INTRUDER_ID, STATUS  
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Field Meaning Default Value 
INTRUDER_ID Node id of intruder NULL 
STATUS Indicate status of intruder. 
0-alive, 1- dead or out of 
network 
0 
 
Algorithm: Flooding Counter-Attack  //Algorithm to carry out Flooding attack 
Step1: if(A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS=1) 
                            exit 
             else 
                       goto step 2 
Step2.  randomly choose packet size Pi    
Step3.  randomly choose attack duration Ti 
Step4. while(Ti  > 0 and A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS=0)  
            do 
                  Send packets 
                  if( A[i] receive REER packet)   //If link broken 
    then 
                 while(TTL <= MAXTTL) 
                 do,     
                                Broadcast RREQ with address of intruder 
                                if(RREP not received within TTL time) 
                                      New TTLold TTL*2 
                 end  
                                     
                  else 
                        Decrement Ti  Ti-1 
                        Continue sending packets 
                  end if 
            end 
            goto step 6 
Step 5. Set A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS 1  //1 indicates   intruder is dead or   out 
of radio range of agent A[i] 
     Step6.  goto Step 1 
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Operation: 
Once the intruder identity is confirmed by the network, the identity of the intruder will be 
multicast to the group of agent nodes. On receiving the intruder identity, each agent node 
will call Initialization to populate its INTRUDER_DETAILS table with INTRUDER_ID 
and initial STATUS as 0 indicating intruder is alive and present inside the network. After 
initialization, each agent node will call Flooding Attack. Each node will first check the 
STATUS field. The attack will happen only if STATUS filed has value set to 0. As the 
attack has not yet started, the condition will be evaluated to false when the agent node 
calls the algorithm the first time. Steps 2 to 5 will be executed and respective actions will 
be taken by agent nodes independently. One important point to remember here is that the 
flooding attack is non-cooperative. The action of one agent node is completely 
independent of another. At step 6, the algorithm repeats itself. The attack will continue 
till one of the following occurs: 
 the intruder node consumes all its energy and eventually dies 
 the intruder node shutdowns itself 
 the intruder leaves the network 
 all the agent nodes have consumed their energy and eventually die 
The logic of updating the STATUS field is the same as explained at the end of the Round 
Robin attack. 
The figure below shows the Flooding Attack model in operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig 3.3 Flooding Counter Attack Model 
1 4 
2 3 
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3.4.3 Self Whisper Round Robin Attack: 
Two randomly selected agent nodes Ai and Aj  in Ga send packets to each other with a 
random packet size Pi and random sending period Ti. The communication channel 
between Ai  and  Aj will be through the intruder. The key idea is to use the intruder as a 
“Router”. This kind of attack has two advantages over the previous two attack models 
where Round Robin focused on wasting intruder energy and Flooding focused on 
overpowering the intruder and forcing it to enter DoS mode. The self whisper model on 
the other hand focuses on both, that is, wasting intruder energy as well as its 
communication bandwidth. To achieve this, multiple pairs of communications between 
agents will happen simultaneously. 
If there are N agents around the intruder then we have 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑅( 
𝑁
2
 )  pairs of 
communication. All of these communications go through intruder. For example, for N=5, 
we have FLOOR (5/2) =2, that is, maximum of 2 communication channels are opened 
through the intruder. 
We make the following assumptions: 
I. Each agent node has a table called “LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR”. This table has 
three fields: LEFT_AGENT, RIGHT_AGENT, FORWARDED_TO 
Field Meaning Default Value 
LEFT_AGENT An agent node left to this 
agent node 
NULL 
RIGHT_AGENT An agent node right to this 
agent node 
NULL 
FORWARDED_TO An agent node to which 
this agent has forwarded 
the GO token 
NULL 
 
II. Each agent node has a table “GROUP”. The table has two fields: NODE_ ID, 
BUSY_STATUS field will take only two values, 0 indicating not busy and 1 
indicating busy. 
Field Meaning Default Value 
NODE_ID Node id of agents NULL 
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BUSY_STATUS If agent node is currently 
active in counter-attack 
NULL 
 
III. Each agent node has another table” INTRUDER_DETAILS”. This table has two 
fields: INTRUDER_ID, STATUS 
Field Meaning Default Value 
INTRUDER_ID Node id of intruder NULL 
STATUS Indicate status of intruder. 
0-alive, 1- dead or out of 
network 
0 
 
IV. GO token has two fields “FORWARDED_FROM” and “FORWARDED_TO”. 
Value for these fields will be set to NULL at the time of generating the GO token. 
Field Meaning Default Value 
FORWARDING_TO An agent node to which 
this agent node has send 
the GO token 
NULL 
FORWARDED_FROM An agent node from which 
this agent node has 
received the GO token 
NULL 
 
Algorithm: Initialization  // Initialize LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR table and GROUP Table 
Step1. for i=0 to |Ga|    
             do,     //|Ga| will give number of agent nodes 
                    A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.LEFT_AGENT  NODE_ ID of immediate 
left agent 
                    A[i]. LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR RIGHT_AGENT  NODE_ ID of immediate 
right agent   
              for j=0 to |Ga|    
              do, 
                            A[i].GROUP.NODE_ID[j]A[j] 
                            A[i].GROUP.BUSY_STATUS[j]0  //0 indicates node is not busy 
              end 
            end  
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Algorithm: Self Whisper Round Robin Counter-Attack  // Algorithm for self whisper counter-
attack 
Step 1:  if(A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS=1) 
                            exit 
              else 
                       goto step 2 
        
Step2.  randomly select an agent A[j]from GROUP table with BUSY_STATUS=0 
Step3. Send invitation to A[j] for communication  
Step4. If invitation rejected                 Set A[j].BUSY_STATUS1 
                 goto step 2 
             else 
                 goto step 5 
Step5. Randomly choose packet size Pi  
Step6. Randomly choose attack duration Ti 
Step4. while(Ti>0 and A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS=0)  
             do 
                  Send packets 
                  if( A[i] receive REER packet)   //If link broken 
    then 
                          while(TTL <= MAXTTL) 
                          do,     
                                Broadcast RREQ with address of intruder 
                                if(RREP not received within TTL time) 
                                      New TTLold TTL*2 
                         end  
                   else 
                        Decrement Ti  Ti-1 
                        Continue sending packets 
                  end if 
            end 
            goto step 6 
Step 5. Set A[i].INTRUDER_DETAILS.STATUS 1  //1 indicates intruder is dead or 
out of radio range of agent A[i] 
Step6. if (GO.FORWARDED_FROM= NULL)    //Ai is first agent to start counter attack     
Set GO. FORWARDED_FROM  NODE_ID of A[i] 
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                 Randomly pick A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.LEFT_AGENT or  
                                             A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT   and forward 
                 GO token 
 else if(GO.FORWARDED_FROM= A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.LEFT_AGENT)   
Set GO.FORWARDED_FROM NODE_ID of A[i] 
                      Forward GO token to A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT 
 else if(GO.FORWARDIED_FROM= A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT)   
                        Set GO.FORWARDED_FROM NODE_ID of A[i] 
                        Forward GO token to A[i].LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR.RIGHT_AGENT 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm: Reply Invitation  //Algorithm explains how an agent node will reply to invitation 
send by another agent node during counter-attack 
Step1. Receive Invitation 
Step2. If currently holding GO token then 
                  Reject invitation 
             else if currently communicating with another agent node 
                  Reject invitation 
             else 
                 Accept invitation 
 
 
Operation: 
Upon receiving the intruder identity from the network, all agent nodes will call 
Initialization. This will populate the table LEFT_RIGHT_NEIGHBOUR with the 
immediately left agent NODE_ID and immediately right agent NODE_ID. The 
INTRUDER_DETAILS table gets populated and initial STATUS is set to 0 indicating 
that intruder is active. Each agent node will also populate the GROUP table with 
NODE_ID of the rest of the agents as well as its own NODE_ID . The BUSY_STATUS 
field is set to 0 indicating that the other agent nodes are free. After initialization, the two 
agent nodes which have possession of the GO token will randomly pick an agent node 
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with STATUS as 0 and will try to establish a communication with it. If the other agent is 
either busy or is a holder of GO token, it will reject the invitation. To reject an invitation, 
when an agent node receive the invitation or request for communication, the recipient 
agent will call Reply invitation method. If it is currently having a possession of a GO 
token or is currently communicating with another agent node, it will reject the invitation, 
otherwise it will accept the invitation and a communication channel will be established 
between the transmit agent node and recipient agent node.  To make sure that 
communications between two agents nodes run through the intruder, during the path 
establishment phase, the node which sends the invitation to another agent node, will 
accept only those RREP which results in a path from the initiator agent node to recipient 
agent node through intruder node. The thesis will not discuss about any modifications 
that needs to be made on top of the AODV protocol since there are many mechanisms 
available to implement it. 
Another important point to note is that during the first round of the counter attack, except 
the two agent nodes which initiate the counter attack, all other nodes must pass the GO 
token to an agent node in the direction of the GO token. If an agent node receives a GO 
token from another agent node to its left, it can only pass the GO token to another agent 
to its right. This constraint will make sure that the counter attack takes place in a round 
robin fashion. The attack will stop once the intruder STATUS is set to 1 in the 
INTRUDER_DETAILS table inside each agent node. Figure 3.4 below shows the Self 
Whisper Round Robin Attack Model in operation. 
 
 
 
 
  
   
Fig 3.4 Self Whisper Round Robin Counter Attack Model 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SIMULATION 
 
4.1 Objective of Simulation 
The objective of the simulation is to study the effectiveness of the proposed counter 
attack models against a single intruder and test our hypothesis as listed below for each 
proposed model. Through simulation we study the following characteristics of each 
model as the number of agent nodes is increased: 
 Energy consumption of intruder. 
 Time taken to neutralize/marginalize the intruder 
 Number of packets dropped by intruder 
Our hypothesis is: 
 For the Round Robin counter-attack model, an increase in the number. of agent 
nodes should not have any impact on packets dropped by the intruder because at 
any given time, only one of the agent nodes will be attacking the intruder Hence, 
an increase in the number of agent nodes in the counter-attack should result in an 
increase in average energy consumption rate for each agent node as newly added 
agent node will also consume energy during the attack, resulting in an increase in 
overall energy consumption by a group of agents. 
 For the Flooding counter-attack model, an increase in the number of agent nodes 
should result in an increase in packet loss by the intruder. This work will 
determine the maximum threshold of the number of agent nodes beyond which,  
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increasing the number of agent nodes joining the counter attack, will not result in an 
increase in the packet loss rate by the intruder. 
 For the Self Whisper Round Robin attack model, our hypothesis is that as the 
number. of agent nodes increase, the overall time to consume the intruder’s 
communication bandwidth and energy should decrease. 
4.2 Simulation Tool 
We use NS-2  as our simulation software. It is free, open source software under the GUI 
license [11]. NS-2 provides substantial support for simulation of TCP, routing, and 
multicast protocols over wired and wireless (local and satellite) networks. The five 
different ad-hoc routing protocols currently implemented for mobile networking in NS-2 
are DSDV, DSR, AODV, TORA and PUMA. NS-2 has very strong support for wireless 
networking and many ad hoc networking protocols have been implemented in NS-2. 
However, the visualization of NS-2 is not that good as compared to other available 
simulators like Net Logo.  
References to NS-2 are listed in the reference section of this thesis. 
 
4.3 Simulation Model 
Our models have three main objects or components:  Ordinary nodes, an attacker and a 
group of agent nodes. We assume in all our models that the attacker has already initiated 
the attack by diverting some, if not all of the network traffic through itself.  To 
accomplish it, the attacker can use false route information and broadcast it to ordinary 
nodes.  
 
4.3.1 Base Model (Why we need it?)    
The objective of having a base model as shown in figure 3.4 below is to measure two 
important parameters that will be used in our three counter-attack models. These two 
parameters are: 
I. To measure energy consumption rate (Joule/sec) of a non-intruder node as a 
function of packet rate (packets/sec). 
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II. To find the threshold packet rate beyond which, increase in packet rate has little 
or no effect on the intruder. 
The first parameter will be required to compute quantum time for the Round Robin and 
Self Whisper counter-attack models. If the network manager decides that an agent node 
should spend only X% of its initial energy during each turn that it will get during round 
robin and self whisper attacks, the first parameter (energy consumption rate) can be used  
to compute the quantum (time slot) as follows: 
Let’s assume that measured value energy consumption rate for non-intruder node 
is Y Joule/sec. Now let’s assume that a network manager wants each agent node 
to spend only X Joule of energy during each turn that it will get. Then  
Quantum = Ceil[X/Y] 
This quantum will be used, every time an agent node receives a chance to counter-attack 
the intruder.  
The second parameter will be used to determine the threshold traffic (Packet Rate) 
beyond which, any increase in traffic has little or no impact on intruder in terms of packet 
drop rate. Threshold traffic is directly proportional to buffer size of intruder. In our 
experiments, we use the threshold traffic as produced by measuring the 2
nd
 parameter 
mentioned above for a fixed buffer size and do not change it. 
 
We have designed a base model with two ordinary nodes communicating with each other 
through an intruder. Ordinary nodes are unaware of the presence of the intruder. Four 
possible energy consumption states are identified: transmitting, receiving, idle and sleep. 
The first two states represent when the node is transmitting and receiving packets 
respectively, the idle state is a state when the node is neither transmitting nor receiving 
packets, but actively listening to the radio transceiver and hence consuming energy. The 
sleep state is a very low power consumption state where the node can neither receive nor 
transmit packets. The cost associated with each packet at a node is represented as the total 
of incremental cost m (unit cost/byte) proportional to the packet size and a fixed cost b 
associated with channel acquisition: 
 
Cost = m * size + b 
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NS-2 has this energy model inbuilt and during the simulation setup, the energy 
consumption rate for each of the four states as mentioned above is set. All nodes have the 
same communication bandwidth (2Mbps), same initial energy (100 Joule) and the same 
MAC interface queue length of 50 packets of size 512 bytes. All the nodes are running on 
the same wireless card i.e. LUCENT IEEE 802.11 2 MBPS WAVELAN PC CARD 2.4 
GHZ DIRECT SEQUENCE SPREAD SPECTRUM [14].  Freenay et. al. [14] and Allard, 
et. al [15] have investigated energy consumption of network interface cards. The above 
mentioned lucent wireless card has been investigated by Freenay [14] for its energy 
consumption under four states, namely, transmitting, receiving, and idle and sleep. 
 
The base model is showen below:  
 
                                                                                                                            
 
Fig 4.1 Base Model setup 
 
O1: Ordinary Node 1 
O2: Ordinary Node 2 
I: Intruder 
             : Communication through Intruder I         
 
4.4 Simulation Setup 
Simulation duration: 600 sec 
Attack starts: 5 sec after simulation starts 
The main parameters used for node creation is mentioned below: 
 
Parameter Value Used For 
Transmission Range 250 m Controls the transmission 
O1 O2 
I 
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range of a node 
RTS/CTS packet threshold 
energy for acceptance in MAC 
layer 
3.65262e-10 
joule 
Any packet has RSSI 
value less then this will 
be dropped. 
IFQ length 50 Node buffer size at MAC 
layer 
MAC type 802_11 Accessing the physical 
layer carrier 
Wireless Interface card Lucent 2.5 GHz 
DSSS  silver 
card with 
2Mbps speed  
Wireless Communication 
between nodes 
Transmission Power 1.3 Joule/sec Power consumed per sec 
during transmission 
Receive Power 0.9 Joule/sec Power consumed per sec 
during receiving  
Idle Power 0.2 Joule/sec Power consumed per sec 
during node being idle 
Packet Size 512 bytes Size of data packet 
Table 4.1 Parameters for node configuration in NS-2 
More information on creating mobile nodes, topology and generating traffic, see [13], 
[16] and [17].  
 
4.5 TCP vs. UDP 
Three counter-attack models are simulated for both TCP as well as UDP based agents. 
The discussion below is primarily oriented from a NS-2 point of view.  
 
4.5.1 TCP (Transmission Control Protocol): - TCP [18] has several objectives: 
 Adapt the transmission rate of packets to available bandwidth. 
 Avoid congestion at the network. 
 Create a reliable connection by re-transmitting lost packets. 
 
In order to control the transmission rate, the number of packets that not yet been received 
is bounded by a parameter called Window (W). This means that the source is obliged to 
wait and stop transmission. The number of packets that it had transmitted and that has not 
been “acknowledged” by receiver reached W. TCP uses Dynamic Congestion Window. 
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The basic idea is as follows: When the window is small, it can grow rapidly, when it 
reaches the large value, it can only grow slowly. When congestion is detected, window 
size decreases drastically. This dynamic behavior of TCP allows rapid adaptation to 
congestion and uses network bandwidth efficiently. 
 
More precisely, let’s assume Wt  is our initial estimation of network bandwidth and W is 
our current window size.  The window W starts with initial value 1. For each received 
ACKs, the W is incremented by 1. So when we receive 1
st
 ACK, W= W+1=2.  This phase 
is called “slow start”. The W will keep continuing increasing in this fashion till W= Wt. 
Next, we enter the second phase called the “Congestion avoidance’ phase, where W 
increases by FLOOR (W/2) for each received ACK. After transmitting W packets, W 
increases by 1. If we transmit W packets at time t, then at time W+RTT, we transmit W+ 
1 packet, at time t+2RTT, we transmit W+2 packets. Hence once can see that window 
growth is linear.  Reference [18] gives more details about TCP. 
 
4.5.2 User Datagram Protocol  
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [19] can send messages, referred to as datagram’s, to 
other hosts on an Internet Protocol (IP) network without requiring prior communications 
to set up special transmission channels or data paths. UDP uses a simple transmission 
model without implicit hand-shaking dialogues for providing reliability, ordering, or data 
integrity. Thus, UDP provides an unreliable service and datagram’s may arrive out of 
order, appear duplicated, or go missing without notice. UDP assumes that error checking 
and correction is either not necessary or performed in the application, avoiding the 
overhead of such processing at the network interface level. Time-sensitive applications 
often use UDP because dropping packets is preferable to waiting for delayed packets, 
which may not be an option in a real-time system. Most often, UDP applications do not 
employ reliability mechanisms. Unlike TCP, UDP based applications don't necessarily 
have congestion avoidance and control mechanisms. Lacking reliability, UDP 
applications must generally be willing to accept some loss, errors or duplication.  
Reference [18] gives more details about UDP.  
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4.6 Experimental Results 
Objective:  
I. To measure the energy consumption rate of the intruder as well as the cumulative 
and individual energy consumption rates of agent nodes as a function of the 
number of packets/sec and number of agent nodes. 
II. To measure packet drop rate of intruder as well as cumulative and individual 
packet drop rate (packets/sec) of agent nodes as a function of the number of 
packets/sec and number  of agent nodes. 
III. To find threshold value for packet rate (packets/sec) beyond which, increase in 
packet rate by agent nodes has little or no effect on results. 
IV. To measure the time taken by each counter-attack model to consume all the 
energy of intruder, that is,  time T when intruder’s energy Ie =0, as a function of 
packet rate (packets/sec) and number of agent nodes. 
 
4.6.1: Base Model 
Simulation Setup:  
Parameter Value 
Number of ordinary nodes 2 
Number of agent nodes 0 
Number of Intruder 1 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Radio transmission range 250 m 
Initial Energy 100 joule for each node 
Packet Rate 2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,512,1024 
Table 4.2 Common node configuration parameter for Base Model 
 
Hypothesis: 
1. Ordinary Node#1 generates the traffic, and ordinary node Node#2 receives the 
traffic. Intruder receives packet from ordinary O1and then forwards the packet to 
ordinary O2. Because the intruder node is acting both as a receiver and as a 
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transmitter, energy consumption rate of intruder should be higher than that of both 
the ordinary nodes, O1 and O2. 
2. As traffic increases, we should observe higher packet drop rates at the intruder. 
The packet drop rate of intruder should be higher or at least equal to packet drop 
rate of O1.  
3. As traffic increases, the time taken for intruder to consume all its energy should 
decrease. 
The graph below confirms our hypothesis. 
O1 = Ordinary node #1  
O2 = Ordinary node #2 
I = Intruder 
Ie = Intruder’s Energy 
 
 
Fig 4.2 Base Model Energy consumption rate (Joule/sec) for TCP 
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Fig 4.3 Base Model Energy consumption rate (Joule/sec) for UDP 
 
 
Fig 4.4 Base Model Packet Drop Rate (Packets/sec) for TCP 
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Fig 4.5 Base Model Packet Drop Rate (Packets/sec) for UDP 
 
 
Fig 4.6 Base Model Time to reach Ie=0 for TCP 
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Fig 4.7 Base Model Time when Ie =0 for UDP 
 
From the above three graphs, we can see that there is very little or no effect on energy 
consumption rate, packet drop rate and time taken to consume intruder’s energy after the 
packet rate crosses 64 packets/sec in both TCP as well as in UDP simulation. This 
behavior is expected as each node has IFQ (At MAC layer) length of 50. Thus, once 
applications start generating packets in excess of 50 packets, the intruder is not able to 
handle such traffic and hence number of packets dropped at intruder becomes steady. The 
simulation shows that the threshold packet rate that an intruder can handle is 64 
packets/sec of size 512 bytes for a single communication channel running through it. 
However, when compared to TCP, in UDP the energy consumption rate of ordinary node 
O1 is almost equal to that of Intruder. As UDP does not have a congestion control 
mechanism, O1 keeps generating and transmitting data packets irrespective of whether 
Intruder (I) is capable of handling such traffic or not Traffic generation consumes energy. 
Hence, the more O1 generates traffic, the more it consumes energy. However, as we can 
see in the graphs above (figure 4.10 and figure 4.11), after the threshold packet rate is 
reached, the energy consumption rate of all three nodes. O1, O2 and I become steady. 
This is because at agent O1 the application layer is generating traffic in excess of what 
O1’s MAC layer can handle, the excess packets are buffered into O1 buffer. If the 
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number of packets buffered at O1 is in excess of 50 which is the size of O1’s buffer, the 
extra packets will be dropped by the MAC layer of O1 before it transmitted. Hence, 
above the threshold packet rate, the amount of traffic that the intruder receives from O1 is 
constant. Hence, energy consumption rate of intruder I also become steady in the case of 
UDP as the packet rate increases, after 100 packets/sec, the packet dropped by O1 
increases rapidly because the size of IFQ length is 50 and O1 generate traffic in excess of 
what its MAC layer can handle. The Intruder can also handle 50 packets /sec (its buffer 
size). Hence, the excessive packets been generated by O1 cause a lot of collision at MAC 
layer. Resulting in higher packet drop rate at O1 compared to intruder. 
The time taken when intruder consumes all its energy is higher in TCP then in UDP. The 
reason behind it is TCP has a dynamic window control mechanism to handle congestion. 
Whenever the intruder node is getting overloaded, it results in congestion in the link 
between O1 and intruder. At this time, intruder publishes a window size of 0 to O1 
indicating that it cannot handle any data packet at this point of time. During this time, 
source O1 does not transmit any data packet. Hence, this results in a longer time period 
for intruder to consume all its energy. 
 
4.6.2: Round Robin 
Simulation Setup: 
Parameter Value 
Number of ordinary nodes 2 
Number of agent nodes 2,4,6 
Number of Intruder 1 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Radio transmission range 250 m 
Initial Energy 100 joule for each node 
Packet Rate 32,64,128,256 
 
Table 4.3 Common node configuration parameter for Round Robin 
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Terminology Used in Graphs:  
                                                   Agent (#2): 2 agents in the simulation 
                                                   Agent (#4): 4 agents in the simulation  
                                                   Agent (#6): 6 agents in the simulation 
                                                   Intruder (#2): 2 agents  
                                                   Intruder (#4): 4 agents  
                                                   Intruder (#6): 6 agents  
                                                   Ie = Intruder’s Energy 
 
Fig 4.8 Round Robin Average energy consumption of Agents and Intruder TCP 
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Fig 4.9 Round Robin Average energy consumption of Agents and Intruder UDP 
 
 
Fig 4.10 Round Robin cumulative energy consumption of Agents and Intruder TCP 
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Fig 4.11 Round Robin cumulative energy consumption of Agents and Intruder UDP 
 
 
Fig 4.12 Round Robin cumulative packet drop rate of Agents and Intruder TCP 
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Fig 4.13 Round Robin cumulative packet drop rate of Agents and Intruder UDP 
 
 
Fig 4.14 Round Robin- Effect of packet rate and #Agents on Time taken when Ie=0, TCP 
0
50
100
150
200
250
32 64 128 256
P
ac
ke
t 
d
ro
p
p
e
d
/s
e
c
Packet/Sec
Cumulative Packet drop rate of Agents vs. 
Intruder
#Agent=2
Intruder(#Agent=2)
#Agent=4
Intruder(#Agent=4)
#Agent=6
Intruder(#Agent=6)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
32 64 128 256
Ti
m
e
 (
in
 s
e
c)
Packet Rate
Packet Rate vs. Time to reach Ie=0 (TCP)
Time(#Agent=2)
Time(#Agent=4)
Time(#Agent=6)
 50 
 
 
Fig 4.15 Round Robin- Effect of packet rate and #Agents on Time taken when Ie =0, 
UDP 
 
As expected, when we increase the number of agent nodes, the average energy 
consumption rate per individual agent node should be less then energy consumption rate 
of Intruder. This is confirmed by Fig. 4.12 for TCP and Fig. 4.13 for UDP. 
Fig 4.16 suggests that as number of agent nodes increase, the packet drop rate at intruder 
increases. However, once we cross threshold packet rate which is 64 packets/sec, we 
should be expecting a smooth curve with little or no variation. Fig 4.16 again confirms 
this assumption. 
But the same assumption cannot be applied when we use UDP instead of TCP. As UDP 
is a connectionless protocol, an increase in packet rate beyond threshold packet rate will 
increase the  packet drop by agents because agents are generating packets in excess of 
what their MAC layer buffer can handle which is 50 packets.  Fig. 4.17 confirms this. 
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An increase in the number of agent nodes should result in a decrease in the time required 
for the intruder to consume all its energy because intruder receives more and more traffic 
from agent nodes. Figure 4.18 and figure 4.19 confirm the same. 
 
Finally, The TCP version of Round Robin counter-attack model performs better than its 
UDP counterpart when it comes to packet drop rate. UDP version performs better when it 
comes to energy consumption rate at Intruder and the time taken to exhaust all the energy 
of Intruder. 
 
4.6.3: Flooding  
Simulation Setup: 
Parameter Value 
Number of ordinary nodes 2 
Number of agent nodes 2,4,6 
Number of Intruder 1 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Radio transmission range 250 
Initial Energy 100 for each node 
Packet Rate 32,64,128,256 
Table 4.4 Common node configuration parameter for Flooding 
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Fig 4.16 Flooding, Individual energy consumption rate of agents vs. Intruder, TCP 
 
 
Fig 4.17 Flooding, Individual energy consumption rate of agents vs. Intruder, UDP 
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Fig 4.18 Flooding, Cumulative energy consumption rate of agents vs. Intruder, TCP 
 
 
Fig 4.19 Flooding, Cumulative energy consumption rate of agents vs. Intruder, UDP 
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Fig 4.20 Flooding, Packet drop rate agents vs. Intruder, TCP 
 
 
Fig 4.21 Flooding, Packet drop rate agents vs. Intruder, UDP 
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Fig 4.22 Flooding, Time taken for Ie =0, TCP 
 
 
Fig 4.23 Flooding, Time taken for Ie =0, UDP 
 
For energy consumption rate of individual agent nodes, we can see from fig 4.20 and Fig 
4.21 that there is not much difference between TCP and UDP. However, UDP performs 
better than TCP for time taken to exhaust intruder energy (Ie). TCP version performs 
better when packet drop rate for intruder is the main objective. 
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On other hand, Fig 4.26 suggests that a smaller agent group yields lower time bound 
compared to a larger agent group. In the flooding counter-attack model, all agent nodes 
start attacking at the same time. This results in very heavy traffic in the links between 
agent nodes and intruder. This results in frequent publishing of window size of zero to 
agent nodes, resulting in frequent halt to the attack. This is confirmed by the simulations. 
 
4.6.4: Self Whisper  
Simulation Setup: 
Parameter Value 
Number of ordinary nodes 2 
Number of agent nodes 2,4,6 
Number of Intruder 1 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Radio transmission range 250 
Initial Energy 100 for each node 
Packet Rate 32,64,128,256 
Table 4.5 Common node configuration parameter for Self Whisper 
 
 
Fig 4.24 self whispers, Average energy consumption rate of Agents vs. Intruder, TCP 
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Fig 4.25 self whispers, Average energy consumption rate of Agents vs. Intruder, UDP 
 
Fig 4.26 self whispers, Cumulative energy consumption rate of Agents vs. Intruder, TCP 
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Fig 4.27 self whispers, Cumulative energy consumption rate of Agents vs. Intruder, UDP 
 
Fig 4.28 self whispers, packet drop rate of Agents vs. Intruder, TCP 
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Fig 4.29 self whispers, packet drop rate of Agents vs. Intruder, UDP 
 
Fig 4.30 self whispers, Packet rate vs. time when Ie=0, TCP 
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Fig 4.31 self whispers, Packet rate vs. time when Ie =0, UDP 
 
The average energy consumption rate for agents in both TCP and UDP are almost 
similar. However, when it comes to packet drop rate, TCP as usual performs better then 
UDP which is blind to the problem of congestion in link. For the time taken by agents to 
exhaust the energy of Intruder, Fig. 4.34 suggest that in TCP, an increase in the number 
of agent nodes need not guarantee lower time bound on time needed to exhaust energy of 
intruder. This is confirmed from Fig 4.35. 
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for agents but maximize them for Intruders except for the 3
rd
 parameter, where the goal is 
to minimize the parameter. 
Secondly, we will repeat the above steps for the UDP version of all three counter attack 
models.  
 
1. Comparison for lower cumulative energy consumption rate for Agents 
 
Fig 4.32 Cumulative energy consumption rate when no. of agents=2 
 
Fig 4.33 Cumulative energy consumption rate when no. of agents=4 
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Fig 4.34 Cumulative energy consumption rate when no. of agents=2 
 
From Fig 4.36, 4.37 and 4.38, it is clear that Round Robin results in lower cumulative 
energy consumption rate. Hence, if the goal of counter attack is to have agent nodes with 
the lowest cumulative energy consumption rate, Round Robin may be a best choice. 
 
2. Comparison based cumulative packet drop rate for agents  
 
Fig 4.35 Packet drop rate of Agents when no. of agents=2 
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Fig 4.36 Packet drop rate of Agents when no. of agents=4 
 
Fig 4.37 Packet drop rate of Agents when no. of agents=6 
 
As we can see, again Round Robin performs better than other two when it comes to the 
lowest packet drop rate by agent nodes. 
 
3. Comparison based on Lowest time taken to exhaust intruder energy 
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Fig 4.38 Time when Ie=0, no. of agents=2, TCP 
 
Fig 4.39 Time when Ie =0, no. of Agents=4, TCP 
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Fig 4.40 Time when Ie =0, no. of Agents=6, TCP 
 
It is clear from above the comparison that, self whisper yields the lowest time required to 
exhaust intruder energy.  Based on three parameters mentioned at beginning of this 
section, Round robin performs better than the other two of models for first two 
parameters. However, for 3
rd
 parameter, self whisper has better performance then Round 
Robin. 
Now, we compare results of the three models from a point of view where impact of attack 
on intruder is maximum. The parameters are: 
1. Highest energy consumption rate 
2. Highest packet drop rate 
3. Least time required to consume entire energy 
 
1. Comparison to find model that results in higher energy consumption rate for 
Intruder  
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Fig 4.41 Energy consumption rate of Intruder when no. of Agents=2 
 
 
Fig 4.42 Energy consumption rate of Intruder when no. of Agents=4 
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Fig 4.43 Energy consumption rate of Intruder when of Agents=6 
 
Self whisper yields the best result if the objective is to have higher energy consumption 
rate for Intruder.  
2. Comparison to find best model that results in higher packet drop rate 
 
Fig 4.44 Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of Agents=2 
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Fig 4.45 Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of Agents=4 
 
 
Fig 4.46 Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of Agents=6 
 
Clearly, the counter-attack model that results in higher packet drop rate for Intruder is 
Self whisper. 
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3. Comparison to find best model that results in least time needed to exhaust 
intruder energy 
As we saw earlier, the self whisper model is the best choice to exhaust intruder energy in 
the least time. Hence, considering all three parameters, self whisper is the best model to 
counter attack an intruder. 
 
For Agents  For Intruder  
Parameter Best Model Parameter Best Model 
Min cumulative 
energy consumption 
rate 
Round Robin Max energy 
consumption rate 
Self Whisper 
Min cumulative 
packet drop rate 
Round Robin Max  packet drop 
rate 
Self Whisper 
Min Time needed to 
exhaust intruder 
energy 
Self Whisper Min Time needed to 
exhaust intruder 
energy 
Self Whisper 
Table 4.6 Model comparison for TCP version 
 
For UDP: 
As for TCP, the best scheme for UDP was studied the findings are summarized below. 
 
Fig 4.47 Cumulative Energy consumption rate of Agents when no. of Agents=2 
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Fig 4.48 Cumulative Energy consumption rate of Agents when no. of Agents=4 
 
 
Fig 4.49 Cumulative Energy consumption rate of Agents when no. of Agents=6 
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Fig 4.50 Energy consumption rate of Intruder when no. of Agents =2 
 
 
Fig 4.51 Energy consumption rate of Intruder when no. of Agents =4 
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Fig 4.52 Energy consumption rate of Intruder when no. of Agents =6 
 
 
Fig 4.53 Cumulative Packet drop rate of Agents when no. of Agents =2 
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Fig 4.54 Cumulative Packet drop rate of Agents when no. of Agents =4 
 
 
Fig 4.55 Cumulative Packet drop rate of Agents when no. of Agents =6 
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Fig 4.56 Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of Agents =2 
 
 
Fig 4.57 Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of Agents =4 
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Fig 4.58 Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of Agents =6 
 
 
Fig 4.59 Time taken to exhaust intruder energy when no. of Agents =2 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
32 64 128 256
P
ac
ke
ts
 d
ro
p
p
e
d
/s
e
c
Packets/sec
Packet drop rate of Intruder when no. of 
agents=6 (UDP)
RR-I (#6)
FLOODING-I(#6)
SW-I(#6)
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
32 64 128 256
Ti
m
e
 (
in
 s
e
c)
Packets/sec
Time when Ie=0 when no. of agents=2 (UDP)
TimeRR(#2)
TimeF(#2)
TimeSW(#2)
 76 
 
 
Fig 4.60 Time taken to exhaust intruder energy when no. of Agents =4 
 
 
Fig 4.61 Time taken to exhaust intruder energy when no. of Agents =6 
 
For Agents  For Intruder  
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Min cumulative 
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Min cumulative 
packet drop rate 
Round Robin Max  packet drop 
rate 
Round Robin 
Min Time needed to 
exhaust intruder 
energy 
Round Robin Min Time needed to 
exhaust intruder 
energy 
Round Robins 
 
Table 4.7 Model comparison for UDP version 
If the protocol used during counter attack is UDP, then as is evident from the table above, 
Round Robin is the best model to use. It results in minimum packet drop rate by agent 
nodes and also takes minimum time to overpower the intruder.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The thesis proposes new way of responding to an intruder in an ad hoc wireless network. 
Taking an offensive approach against an intruder has some basic advantages like reduced 
rate of successful attack, extra layer of security, wasting intruder’s resources etc. The 
choice of counter-attack model depends upon the objective of the counter-attack. If 
objective is to exhaust intruder’s critical resource like energy, bandwidth in the least 
amount of time, and if the protocol used is TCP, self whisper is definitely a best choice.  
But if the objective is to have minimum energy consumption rate and minimum packet 
drop rate for agent nodes, Round Robin is the best choice with TCP. 
On the other hand, if the protocol used for counter-attack is UDP, and the objective is to 
consume maximum amount of intruder energy, self whisper performs better but if the 
objective is to have maximum packet drop rate at the intruder in the minimum time 
period, Round Robin is perhaps a best choice. 
The optimal packet transmission rate for the proposed models is <= 64. Beyond this limit, 
an increase in packet transmission rate has little or no effect on the outcome. Another 
important point to mention is that, simply increasing the number of agent nodes does not 
yield a better result. Instead, smaller group of agent nodes appear to perform better then a 
large one.
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We believe counter-attack is a promising approach in many special applications such as a 
the battlefield. This is especially important if the attacker is more intelligent and powerful 
in terms of resources such as energy, communications, processing power and buffer size. 
Therefore, future research will focus on exploiting the scenarios where an intruder is 
more powerful than an individual agent node. A scenario where multiple intruders are 
attacking the network and network administrator has limited number of agents is another 
area for future work. This thesis has focused on exploiting the idea of counter-attacks. 
There are many questions which remain unanswered in this thesis; these include: 
1. How the models will perform if the intruder is more powerful than ordinary 
nodes. 
2. How to respond if multiple intruders are executing multiple type of attacks in the 
network? 
3. In the case of multiple intruders launching multiple type of attacks, how is a 
network manager to decide which attack to respond to first? What should be the 
parameters based on which a network manager can take a decision?  
4. How to prioritize among several attacks launched by Intruders?      
5. What are the legal consequences if agent nodes attack an ordinary node due to 
mistaken identity? 
These are questions that need to be addressed in future work. 
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Ad-Hoc Mobile Wireless Network (MANETs) have emerged and evolved in many   
forms. MANETs are rapidly gaining popularity because they do not rely on a pre- 
infrastructure and can be deployed spontaneously. However, compared to wired  
networks, MANETs are more vulnerable to security attacks due to their unique features,  
such as stringent power consumption, error prone communication media and highly  
dynamic network topology.  Most of the work done for improving security are focused on  
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Findings and Conclusions:   
 
Simulation results shows that proposed counter attack models are an effective tool to  
counterattack. Simulation shows that a single model may not perform well in all  
situations. The choice of counter attack model is highly governed by the objective of   
counterattack. The Self-Whisper attack is the best if the objective is to have minimum  
energy consumption rate and minimum packet drop rate for agent nodes. On the other  
hand, if the protocol used is UDP, and the objective is to consume  maximum amount of  
intruder energy, self- whisper performs better but if the objective is to have maximum  
packet drop rate at the intruder in the minimum time period, Round Robin is perhaps a  
best choice. Simulation shows that once counter attack begins, any traffic that is through  
intruder is disrupted. This disruption causes the ordinary nodes that have been tricked by  
the intruder advertizing false route information, to seek an alternate path to the  
destination. Hence, counter attack helps in improving security of the network as a whole. 
 
